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Bioterror and “Bioart” — A Plague o’ Both Your Houses
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of bioterrorism has caused Congress and the President to
dramatically increase research funding for countermeasures, including funding for new biosecurity laboratories. The new kind of war against nonstate actors who use terror to intimidate populations
has also made the creation of new ethical and legal
rules for researchers seem critical. New laws have
been passed, and there have been proposals for
new codes of ethics for bioterrorism-related research. Almost five years after September 11, however, the outcome of the development of new research rules remains uncertain.
Ethical guidelines for life sciences research
that could be related to bioterrorism are critical,
and the scientific community should be actively
engaged in setting the standards for such research.1,2 As the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences has stated, “biological scientists have an affirmative moral duty
to avoid contributing to the advancement of biowarfare or bioterrorism.”1 It is reasonable for society to expect that scientists will adopt the equivalent of the physician’s “do no harm” principle.1
Arguing for such an oath well before September
11, literary scholar Roger Shattuck noted that it
could “help scientists scrutinize the proliferation
of research in dubious areas” as well as “renew
the confidence of ordinary citizens” in what is a
potentially revolutionary endeavor.3
As the debate about the role of ethical standards proceeds, some legal standards have already been adopted. Even with their new legal
powers, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have been
unable to discover the source of the anthrax attacks. The FBI investigations have, however, focused on two other biosafety cases that have become infamous. Neither of these cases involves
bioterrorism, but both illustrate how — in a post–
September 11 world — the federal government
and the public can be expected to react and even
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overreact if new biosafety rules are broken in
ways that may create a biohazard or public health
problem.

The C a se of Thoma s Bu tler
Dr. Thomas Butler was the first and so far the only
physician-scientist to stand trial in the United
States on a bioterrorism-related charge after September 11. On January 2, 2006, Butler completed
a two-year sentence that was imposed after a jury
trial and upheld by a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.4 The bioterrorism-related facts no longer
seem to be in serious dispute.
According to his colleagues in the field of
infectious disease, Butler has had a long and
successful career dating from completion of medical school and residency at Johns Hopkins University at the end of the 1960s and his service in
Vietnam in the Naval Medical Research Unit. He
was a faculty member at Johns Hopkins University Medical Center and Case Western Reserve
University before becoming chief of infectious
diseases at Texas Tech University Health Sciences
Center in 1987, a post he held until his trial. His
work on plague (Yersinia pestis) dates from his experiences treating civilians in the Vietnam War.
Most recently, this work involved research in Tanzania, where he and a colleague there compared
the efficacy of gentamicin with that of doxycycline in treating patients with plague infection.5
The results of this research were published soon
after Butler was released from prison.6
Butler traveled to Tanzania to help set up the
study in 2001, and he returned in 2002 to collect
samples of Y. pestis taken from the subjects. He
returned to the United States with these samples
without the required transport permits. In June,
he drove to the laboratory of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Fort Collins,
Colorado, to have the samples tested, again without the required government transport permits.
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In September 2002, he sent a set of plague isolates back to Tanzania in a Federal Express box
labeled “laboratory materials” without the required
export permits, and in October, he flew from Lubbock, Texas, to Washington, D.C. (to the Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases), with plague samples without the required
permit.
In November 2002, after a series of confrontations over timely documentation of complications and death among subjects in a study of antibiotics for the biotechnology company Chiron,
Butler’s local institutional review board prohibited him from performing research on human
subjects. On January 9, 2003, the board, dissatisfied by his lack of cooperation, reiterated the
suspension in an e-mail.7 On January 10, he was
notified by letter of a formal inquiry into his activities. On January 11, a Saturday morning, Butler noticed that a set of 30 tubes of Y. pestis cultures was missing, and he noted in his journal,
“Set 5 missing!” The next day, he wrote, “Can’t
explain other than intentional removal, suspect
theft.”8 On Monday, January 13, 2003, he reported to the biosafety officer at the health center
that 30 vials of Y. pestis were missing from his
laboratory. The next day, senior officials at the
health center met and decided to notify the local police and the health department. The police
notified the FBI, and more than 60 FBI agents
and local police officers conducted an immediate investigation.
Butler was questioned by the FBI, and he waived
his right to counsel (this waiver is almost always
a mistake). He first insisted that he did not know
what happened to the samples. However, after
failing a lie-detector test (the failure was not admitted in court) and, he says, being told by an FBI
agent that if he signed a statement that he had
accidentally destroyed the samples (to reassure
the public that there was no danger), that would
be the end of the matter, he signed a statement
to this effect.4,9 However, this statement was not
the end of the matter. Butler was arrested, spent
six days in jail, and then was placed under house
arrest. In April 2003, a grand jury returned a
15-count indictment charging him with various
crimes relating to his transport of Y. pestis, making false statements to the FBI, and tax evasion.
Texas Tech also turned against Butler and helped
the prosecution reframe the university’s contract
disputes with him as crimes. In August 2003,
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after Butler refused to plead guilty in exchange
for a six-month sentence, he was charged with 54
additional criminal counts; these included mail
fraud, wire fraud, and embezzlement arising from
Butler’s research for two companies (Chiron and
Pharmacia–Upjohn — now Pfizer) and concealment of two contracts with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) from the university.4
As part of Butler’s pay structure, a percentage
of his income was provided by the state of Texas
and the remainder came from the university’s
Medical Practice Income Plan, which included
money earned from seeing patients, research
grants, and clinical trials. All monies from these
sources, with the exception of consulting contracts, were to be remitted to the Health Sciences
Center. Butler entered into contracts with both
Pharmacia and Chiron in which his fee per subject would be split between the Health Sciences
Center and himself. These contracts, the first of
which commenced in 1998, continued until August 2001, and they did not come to the attention
of the Health Sciences Center until July 2002.4
Butler voluntarily gave up his medical license
before the trial. After the three-week trial, which
included testimony from 40 witnesses, a jury found
Butler not guilty on almost all the plague-related
charges (which included lying to the FBI) and not
guilty of tax evasion. It did, however, find him
guilty on most of the charges related to his splitfee contract arrangements (44 of the 54 fraud
counts) and on 3 of the 18 charges relating to the
transport of plague samples.4 He was sentenced
to 24 months in prison and 3 years of supervised
release and was charged $15,000 in fines and
$38,675 restitution to the university. He appealed.
Five issues were raised on appeal. The two
most important of these issues dealt with the possibly prejudicial effect of combining the “plague
counts” with the contract counts and whether
there was sufficient evidence of criminal intent
relative to the failure to file the required shipping forms for plague samples. Regarding the
first issue, the appeals court ruled without much
discussion (and arguably without much understanding of how medical research is conducted)
that all these counts could be combined because
they all had to do with Butler’s “research efforts”:
“Butler’s handling of plague bacteria as part of
his research efforts was ultimately related to his
scheme to defraud HSC [Health Sciences Center]
by concealing both his contracts with the FDA
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and the split contracts Butler maintained with the
two pharmaceutical companies.”4 If the Supreme
Court agrees to hear his appeal, the possibly prejudicial effect of combining these counts is Butler’s
strongest argument.
The appeals court also had little sympathy for
Butler’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted willfully in regard
to the only 3 plague-related charges (of 18 charges) he was convicted of: first, exporting plague
to Tanzania without a license; second, describing
plague as “laboratory materials” on a Federal Express waybill; and third, violating federal hazardous materials regulations in shipping plague to
Tanzania.4 Regarding the first and third plaguerelated charges, the court was persuaded that because Butler “had successfully and legally shipped
hazardous materials [during the 1990s] at least
30 times before making this particular shipment”
there was sufficient evidence that he knew how
to ship it properly and that “his infraction could
not have been due to a good faith mistake or a
misunderstanding of the law.” As for Butler’s
contention that he did not intend to deceive anyone by labeling plague “laboratory materials,” the
court accepted the government’s argument that
he had also certified on the same label that he
was “not shipping dangerous goods” and that
the jury could reasonably conclude that he knew
“that plague was a dangerous good requiring the
proper identification.”4

“ Bioar t ” and Bioterr orism
Shortly after Butler’s trial, in another part of the
country — Buffalo, New York — FBI agents were
called in to investigate a suspected act of bioterrorism in the home of Steve Kurtz, a professor
and artist at the State University of New York at
Buffalo. Kurtz awoke on May 11, 2004, to find
his wife dead beside him. Kurtz and his wife previously had cofounded the Critical Art Ensemble,
an artists’ collective “dedicated to exploring the
intersections between art, technology, radical politics and critical theory.”10 Kurtz liked to distinguish what he did from the emerging field of
“bioart,” which is perhaps best known to the public because of the notoriety of Alba, a rabbit that
glowed green because of the insertion of a jellyfish gene. Kurtz thinks of bioart as consisting of
stunts and his own art as an exploration of “the
political economy of biotechnology.”10 He had
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previously argued against the introduction of genetically modified food, and he had encouraged
activists to oppose it by means of “fuzzy biological sabotage” — for instance, by releasing genetically mutated and deformed flies at restaurants to stir up paranoia.10
The day after his wife’s death, the FBI raided
his home in full biohazard gear. Kurtz had been
studying the history of germ warfare for a new
project. In connection with this project, he was
growing bacterial cultures that he was planning
to use to simulate attacks with anthrax and plague.
He had obtained the bacteria samples (Serratia
marcescens and Bacillus atrophaeus) from a colleague,
Professor Robert Ferrell, a geneticist at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, who had
ordered them for him from the American Type
Culture Collection. Kurtz and Ferrell were suspected almost immediately of being involved in
a bioterror ring and were thoroughly investigated. Once the New York Department of Health
determined that the bacteria were harmless and
that Kurtz’s wife had died of natural causes, the
bioterrorism investigation was dropped. The Justice Department nonetheless charged both Ferrell
and Kurtz with four counts of wire fraud and mail
fraud. The allegation was that Ferrell, at Kurtz’s
request, defrauded the University of Pittsburgh and
the American Type Culture Collection by representing that the bacteria samples he ordered
would be used in his University of Pittsburgh
laboratory.11 Neither case has yet gone to trial.
Exactly what Kurtz was planning to do with
the bacteria is unclear, but serratia, which is
known for its ability to form bright red colonies,
has been used in biowarfare simulations in the
past. Perhaps its most well-known use was a
1950 simulation in which an offshore naval vessel blanketed a 50-square-mile section of San
Francisco with an aerosol spray containing serratia to determine what dose could be delivered effectively to the population.12 Whether using a similar technique as an art exhibit would constitute
bioart, biotechnology, or biohazard (or even bioterrorism) may be in the eye of the beholder even
more than in the eye of the artist or scientist.
Bioart is not bioterrorism, but the two are related politically. As bioart curator and commentator Jens Hauser has said, bioart aims “at the
heart of our fears” and is meant to “disturb.” He
notes, “these artists expose the gulf between the
apologetic official discourse about technosci-
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ence on the one hand, and paranoia on the other.”13 Like defensive and offensive bioweapons
research, bioart and biotechnology may be impossible to distinguish by anything other than
the researcher’s or creator’s intent. Thus, Alba, the
bunny with the inserted jellyfish gene, is considered to be and is accepted as a creation of
bioart, at least in the contemporary art community; whereas ANDi, the monkey with the inserted jellyfish gene, is considered to be a creation of
science, at least in the biotechnology community.
Hauser was referring to paranoia in the face of
the “rapid acceleration of technical prowess.”13
On the basis of the reaction of federal law enforcement to the actions of Thomas Butler and
Steve Kurtz, however, although the advances of
biotechnology that have potential applications to
bioterrorism and biowarfare are scary, even scarier are the responses — in the name of preventing bioterrorism — of law-enforcement agencies
to legitimate scientists and artists whose actions
pose no threat to the public.
Butler’s arrest came about one year after a
simulated bioterrorism event in Lubbock, Texas;
this simulation involved the use of aerosolized
plague at a civic center.5 Simulations have been a
centerpiece of efforts to prepare for acts of bioterrorism. As we should have learned from our
obsession with building bomb shelters during the
Cold War, however, simulations promote fear of
worst-case scenarios and make them look much
more likely. Bioterrorism simulations such as Dark
Winter (smallpox) and Top Officials (TOPOFF)
(plague) involve more art than science and are
likely to provoke a response based more on fear
than logic. They should probably be classified as
bioart in the sense of performance art, and they
should have their most socially useful outlet not
in federal law-enforcement agencies or biosafety
laboratories but in television dramas like 24.

Bioterr orism and Science
The case of physician-researcher Thomas Butler
has been the subject of many commentaries —
most arguing that his prosecution represents a
gross overreaction on the part of federal authorities. Nonetheless, in an article in Science, Margaret A. Somerville and Ronald M. Atlas argued that
Butler’s prosecution “sent a clear signal to the research community, especially scientists and uni-
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versity researchers, that all ethical and legal requirements must be respected when undertaking
research.”14 They continued, “Biosafety regulations
are not merely legal technicalities. They constitute
some of the terms of the pact between science
and the public that establishes public trust.”14
Somerville and Atlas are correct to argue that
researchers must take law and ethics seriously,
and their call for a new code of ethics is reasonable. It would be too broad, however, to suggest
either that there are no such things as “legal
technicalities” or that all such technicalities are
reasonable. Jennifer Gaudioso and Reynolds M.
Salerno of the Sandia National Laboratories, for
example, have argued persuasively that not all
pathogens and toxins pose the same risks and
that risk in the laboratory should “be a function
of an agent’s weaponization potential and consequences of its use” (rather than the current assessment of biosafety risk, which focuses on “infectious disease dangers and the risk of accidental
exposure in the laboratory”).15 They also note that
under the regulations of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism and Response Act that require entities with certain agents to register with
the CDC, only 323 of the 817 facilities that the
CDC expected to register actually did.15 Other facilities may register, but many research entities
decided to discontinue their research projects,
rather than conform to the new federal administrative and security rules for such research.15
A 2006 National Academy of Sciences report rejects the use of an agent-specific threat list and
instead recommends adoption of a “broader perspective on the ‘threat spectrum’ . . . to ensure
regular and deliberate reassessments of advances in science and technology and identification
of those advances with the greatest potential for
changing the nature of the threat spectrum.”2
Ethics and law are related, but they are not
the same. Law draws the line we cannot cross
without becoming “outlaws.” Even if we do not
like it, we must nonetheless follow it (while working to change it) or risk, as Butler did, being
prosecuted for being an outlaw. All Americans,
including physicians, should recognize that when
the FBI wants to talk to them about their role in a
possible bioterrorist event, they should not talk
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to the FBI without first speaking with a lawyer.
Americans can go to jail for violating the law,
but not for violating codes of ethics. We aspire to
uphold ethics — we deserve praise (at least some)
for behaving “ethically”; whereas we deserve none
for simply following the law, some of which is in
fact made up of “legal technicalities.”
Because the differences between research on
offensive biologic weapons and research on defensive biologic weapons are a matter of degree,
not kind, and because biotechnology research is
an international activity, any evidence that such
research is doing more to put the public at risk
than to protect the public will (and should) be
especially damaging to the entire enterprise. This
is one reason why Butler’s report of missing
plague bacteria (still unaccounted for) could not
be tolerated by federal officials who support the
expansion of research on countermeasures. It is
also what makes Kurtz’s bioart so disturbing —
the public is confronted with the dark side of
bioterrorism-related research, and it provokes a
response. The inherent dual nature of biodefense research has been dubbed “the Persephone
effect,” which refers to Demeter’s daughter who
was forced to spend six months every year with
Pluto in Hell so she could live the other half of
the year on Earth.16
One reasonable response to the dispute between Butler and the Justice Department and
the dispute between Kurtz and the Justice Department could be Mercutio’s retort in Romeo and
Juliet: “A plague o’ both your houses.”17 This is
because the public is currently more victim and
bystander than participant and seems much more
likely to be harmed than helped by much of the
research. Members of the public recognize this
probability, and their skepticism of federal authorities, of the effectiveness of countermeasures,
of the existence of weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq, and of the entire bioterrorism scare is
well illustrated by the few people who took drugs
to treat anthrax that were offered after the anthrax attacks.18 This same skepticism, combined
with the lack of evidence of stockpiles of smallpox in Iraq and the certainty of side effects from
the drugs, also explains the small number of
health professionals who volunteered to take the
smallpox vaccine immediately before and shortly
after the commencement of the war in Iraq.18
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Table 1. Seven Classes of Microbial Experiments That Should Require Review.*
The experiments would:
Demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective
Confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents
Enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent
Increase transmissibility of a pathogen
Alter the host range of a pathogen
Enable the evasion of diagnostic and detection methods
Enable the weaponization of a biologic agent or toxin
* Data are from the National Research Council.1

E thic s , Bioterr orism,
and Life Science s Re se ar ch
Research directed at creating new pathogens or
toxins that have direct bioterror or biowarfare applications deserves condemnation. The National
Research Council, for example, has identified
seven classes of microbial experiments (Table 1)
that should “require review and discussion by
informed members of the scientific and medical
community before they are undertaken.”1 If such
experiments are undertaken at all, I believe there
also should be a requirement for publication of
the protocol and public input into the decision.
Research directed at individual pathogens and
their weaponization potential also risks the diversion of scientific resources from more important public health concerns,19 just as it has seemed
to divert the FBI’s attention from real terrorists.
There appears to be a consensus in the scientific community that the free and open exchange
of information is ultimately the best defense to
both naturally occurring pandemics and deliberate biologic attacks.2,20 There is also a growing
recognition of the importance of developing an
international code of ethics for scientists as well
as a recognition that such a code must “become
part of the lived culture” of scientists.2,20 Like
bioart, the development of this code remains a
work in progress.
No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
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